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BY D. E. PHILLIPS
WHAT a title—New Humanism which dreads the future,
looks to and worships the past ; a movement behind which
one recognizes the echoes of deductive speculative thinking for the
past two thousand years ; a movement in which rationalization
plays the chief part ; a movement that throws psychology over-
board as a pseudo-science, yet grounds itself upon psychological
assumptions ; a movement that does not realize the instability of all
subjective standards in literature, art, morals, and religion ; a move-
ment in search of an objective basis for conduct ; a movement
grounded on the false assumption of the Middle Age logic, that
words have fixed meanings in them : a movement looking for ob-
jective stability where only relative, partial subjective stability
exists such are the characteristics this title suggests. So strong
is this current that one thinks constantly of Robinson's The Mind
in the Making, James' Will to Believe, or of Dewey's FIoiv we
Think. When the great dramatist, Ibsen, was so drastically criticized
for his literary departures he rightly replied: "In the world of
ideals there is no stability."
But the struggle to stabilize the ideals of art, literature, morals,
and religion has always been present. The struggle has given us
our objective laws and commandments and a long line of stabiliz-
ing critics. They have failed because in these forms of conduct
words have no fixed meaning and because the evolution of the
human soul constantly furnishes us with varied and new ideals.
Vast expansions take place in the use of the same words. Look
at the use of the word Christianity for nearly two thousand years.
Would anyone even think of maintaining that its use has been con-
stant, either in practice or in content-belief ? Think of what Chris-
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tianity meant in the early days, in the Middle Ages and of what it
means now. Yet it is Christianity.
Since the attack of the New Humanism seems to be on psy-
chology, and since the Humanists constantly emphasize this fact,
it seems that psychology should no longer remain silent and let
the popular mind infer that the New Humanists are correct in their
assertions and assumptions. They declare that "sociology and psy-
chology are mere pseudo-sciences." P. E. More tells us that "the
question at issue is thus ultimately one of philosophy and psy-
chology." He also says: "As between the humanist and the natural-
ist it is the former who stands for the great affirmation ; it is the
latter who through obstinate ignorance or in the name of pseudo-
science, limits and contracts and distorts and denies." How per-
fectly simple. Throw all possible scientific study of human na-
ture over-board and then by "the great affirmation" assume as true
an old ancient psychological foundation.
These assumptions are:, an inherent sense of decorum, free-
will, purpose, and rational guidance of conduct. However, it is per-
fectly clear that they were driven to assume this foundation. To
assume, as P. E. More finally does that religious authority is the
basis of the New Humanism is to carry us back to Medieval think-
ing. To assume that the Greeks were by some strange gift of the
gods blessed with an intuition of true decorum, is not much better.
Aristotle was perhaps the greatest scholar that ever walked the
earth until modern times. Yet he \\'Qs just human. To teach and
act as if the great minds of art, music, literature and morals have
all long since passed away is too pessimistic for a growing soul.
With all due respect to the shades of the mighty dead, I will build
by faith on the young, uncorrupted minds of the children of our
generation and of generations to come. The Middle Ages fur-
nishes us with a good example of a whole civilization being over-
come by an inferiority complex. The distinguished scholar, David-
son, summed up the Renaissance as the rehabilitation of nature and
the Reformation as the rehabilitation of reason. In modern psy-
chological terms the whole transition depended upon the recoverv
of self-confidence,^—the removal of inferiority. So there seems to
have been only three possible foundations on which the New Hu-
manism could build ;—the assumption of religious authority ; the
reliance on ancient authority with Aristotle as chief corner stone
;
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or the assertion of deductive dogmas on which to build. What one
really finds is the assumption of such a psychological foundation
as I have named,
—
zi'hich happens to he both aneicnt and religious.
Let us examine briefly this psychological foundation of the Hu-
manists. I make no claim to any knowledge of literary criticism,
but I do claim some acquaintance with the fundamentals of psy-
cl^ology, and for many years I have given a course entitled Psy-
chology in Literature.
The assumption of a sense of decorum as "that something m
man's nature that sets him apart from other animals" and that makes
"humanism differ from religion," followed by the assumption of
free-wall which "must simply be accepted as a mystery" consti-
tutes the foundation on which Mr. Babbitt builds. When we learn
historically the endless forms which decorum has assumed among
different peoples and at different periods of human development
we wonder if decorum made religion or religion made decorum.
Or do they develop hand in hand? Who has been commissioned to
select the original innate type which "sets man apart from the other
animals"?
In our dictionaries decorum means "seemliness, propriety, usage
required by politeness and decency"—rather a complex affair to be
inherited. But politeness and decency have in the main been con-
duct sanctioned by religion. Have we, or do we need anything
more than a combination of natural impulses and instincts of hu-
manity on which to base both decorum and religion? An analysis
of any specific human conduct will reveal the presence of tenden-
cies and instincts common to the higher animals. The complexity
of environment gives us almost unlimited variation. There are
no grounds for assuming that we have something that is unnatural
and that sets us apart from nature. Have not the chief contentions
of religion been that man has "something in his nature that sets
him apart from animals," and that free-will makes him a moral
being? I fail to see how Mr. Babbitt can separate Humanism from
Religion by either of his chief assumptions.
Seward CoUins's attempt to protect Mr. Babbitt from the ac-
cusation of religious assumptions is equally futile. When a psy-
chologist reads that long brutal tirade of words which Mr. Collins
pours out in the Bookman, he wonders how such a writer can
speak of others as being prejudiced and narrow-minded. He calls
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the whole opposition a "myth-attack", and charges the opponents
with reading into Professors More and Babbitt what they did not
say. Yet he devotes half of his long article to reading into Mr.
Brooks what he admits Mr. Brooks said little about ; and then says
;
"But the point is it is actually the key to everything he has written."
Perhaps he is right, but why should such a procedure be wrong
when exercised by others? It is probably true that the writers on
each side of this dispute are promoted consciously and unconscious-
ly by their religious attitudes and previous training,—something
quite different from their free-will. Even the U. S. Senate shows
this much appreciation of psychology in appointing Judges to the
Supreme Court.
The intellectual struggle for recognition of something called
free-will seems to be as old as human thinking. The fact that so
many seem not free to let go of the idea and look with dread upon
all sciences that seem to threaten its validity, appears to argue more
for the power of tradition and teaching than for freedom. But
more than that there is a great family of beliefs that have attached
themselves to this one. I have no intention of entering into a de-
fense of either side. But I do want to offer a few suggestions con-
cerning methods of attack and of escape for those who seem so
distressed.
When Mr. Babbitt says that free-will "must simply be ac-
cepted as a mystery that may be studied in its practical effect", I
fear he has stepped upon psychologically dangerous ground. Psy-
chologists have invited all theorists to join them in a search for
"its practical effects." The psychologist says "show me a simple
act where adec|uate causes for its performance cannot be found in
man's natural instincts, in his training, in his surroundings, in his
physical and emotional make up, in the sum total of his mental re-
lations, in the. unconscious driving force of his endocrine glands."
Nearly a quarter of a century ago the famous physician Dr. Lorand
said that ivill pozi'Cr always means a healthy condition of the endo-
crine glands. Since then thousands of experiments on human in-
dividuals and animals have produced "practical effects." ]\Iany
a poor Cretin child without will or push has been made into a nor-
mal being.
Let us open up a typical case in practical effects. A college stu-
dent about thirty years old was sure of practical freedom. He was
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asked if he felt that he could develop genuine hatred for his mother.
He replied "Of course I could if I wanted to." Certainly such a
universal dodging of the question can no longer exist among think-
ing people. We do not care anything about what he wants. We are
seeking the forces which make him want to do so and so.
The gentleman was then asked to pick out from his long experi-
ence the one act he considered most certainly a free-will act. He
said it was the night he walked the floor until 2 o'clock in the morn-
ing and decided to volunteer in the Spanish-American War. But
it was soon revealed that he was president of the Y. M. C. A. in
his college, that forty members had already volunteered, that his
father served in the Civil War, that he had received a letter from
his father on the subject just that day, that he was not married
and belonged to the cadet corps. As psychologists we do not care
to theorize about free-will, but to analyze the strongest practical
evidence that can be produced in its favor. James long ago at-
tempted a complete analysis of these practical exam.ples and finally
concluded that we cannot prove freedom on any practical or his-
torical grounds. Nevertheless, he held that it was wise to assert free-
dom for moral ends. This we take to be the attitude of most of
the New Humanists. But this attitude is built upon two wrong
psychological assumptions. In the main conduct is not the result
of any speculation or rational thinking which the New Humanism
everywhere assumes. Even their critics seem to be laboring under
the same mistake. I do not know anyone who is not either a blind
worshipper of the past or has only a superficial knowledge of hu-
man nature, who still clings to the idea that man's conduct is regu-
lated by rational thinking. I am here talking about human relations
and not the building of canals and skyscrapers. Of course, he rea-
sons much about his neighbor, Jones, about his lost generation,
about his religion, about labor and capital. But only lift up the
curtain and see what is guiding his reasoning. His original na-
ture, his training, his associations and experiences in life will be
found everywhere.
Again, I am not astonished that the Humanists should assume
that we could have no moral world without the freedom of the will.
Their past thinking almost insured this. But I am surprised that
such a keen thinker as James should not have seen that the moral
order of the universe may be as real as any other part of it, even
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without freedom. May not moral responsibility be a natural part
of human development by which certain lines of conduct and con-
formity are secured? Certainly no one would maintain that the
feeling of a mother's responsibility for her children is a product
of free-will
;
yet it has moral value.
Hunger and thirst are the safeguards to physical life. The
feeling of responsibility performs a similar fvmction for moral
life. Responsibility is a moral medicine to the end of begetting
healthy moral life. Man is not something apart from these internal
forces, being pushed on by them ; he is himself the sum total of
these internal forces. Human conduct is not logic, but feeling in ac-
tion.
This is, I suppose, what P. E. More calls a false psychology that
robs life of its true values. Mainly of course because these values
are not given objectively,
—
dream values, he calls them. Seward
Collins cries out "pseudo-humanities of sociology and psychology."
This search after objectivity, after fixed values, after the un-
changeable elements in human conduct will never be satisfied with-
out accepting objective authority, and Mr. P. E. More realizes that
even Pascal and Aristotle are not sufficient. That is good news.
Let us hope, that we will not return to the days when no one could
graduate from Oxford without signing a pledge not to teach any-
thing contrary to Aristotle. It is Aristotle's false law about the
excluded middle that gives Mr. More and others much trouble,
Alan is either good /or bad. A thing is either right or wrong, na-'
tural or supernatural. The sooner we forget such playing with
words the better. Mr. More is distressed over Pascal's saying that,
"unless man has the support of the supernatural, he will fall ir-
resistably into Stoic pride or Epicurean relaxation." Even if he
should escape what he calls dream values by accepting objective
authority he is still confronted with the fact that words have no
fixed meanings, and that all assumed objective value must be in-
terpreted subjectively.
"Thou shalt not lie" is a general formula of definite moral
value, but it will always have varied interpretations. In what ways
may one lie? By what standard will you declare any specific state-
ment a lie? Has the physician who acts as if you are going to get
well when he believes you will die, lied to you?
Values grow out of human needs, human desires, and the teach-
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ings and experiences of the ages. When we believed "this world
a wilderness of woe," wealth was not only valueless but dan-
gerous. But why should values that so originate be called dream
values? Those of us who believe in evolution believe that nature
is continually begetting new products. Why could not the moral
order be one of them? There seems to be no reason except that
Aristotelian dualism might suffer therefrom.
It seems as if the Humanists are playing with a half dozen
psychological assumptions all wrapped up together. P. E. More
says : "Now in one sense humanism takes its stand unhesitatingly
on the affirmation of purpose. Its animus against Naturalism is
based on the evident fact that the rejection of free-will deprives life
of any possibility of purpose." Is this really true or only one of the
"great affirmations"? Is it theoretically or practically true? Can
we escape the fact that animals everywhere manifest purpose? I
know: there are some psychologists who deny this. But I am not
one of them. One of the interesting contradictions of our Be-
havioristic friends is their determined purpose to convert the rest
of us. Children manifest push and purpose in a variety of ways,
long before they have been corrupted by our theological beliefs.
Physicians tell us that push and purpose depend largely upon cer-
tain secretions of the glands which they can now in part artificial-
ly supply. Not long ago a physician called my attention to a young
lady who had so much push and purpose that a third of her thyroid
gland had to be removed.
When I ^vas a boy, I was much confused to learn that the
Presbyterians in my community did not believe in the freedom
of the will. Yet they never lacked in purpose to convert the rest
of us, and, to their credit, no group in the community showed
any more push and purpose for the good of the community. All
their actions were directed with an eye to the future good. Could
any one say that St. Augustine, John Calvin or Jonathan Edwards
lacked purpose and push?
This is all due to our inability to recognize the modern scientific
background of human conduct. We return to that false assumption
that conduct depends on rationalized beliefs. So all of the assump-
tions of the New Humanism are ancient and, whether true or false,
smell of the ages. The freedom of the will is the chief stumbling
block in the whole fabric. When we come to realize that will is
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only the resultant of all the forces acting on ns at any one time,
that conduct is chiefly the result of concentrated feelings and that
we may have a moral world without free-will, it is like the pas-
sage from blackest night to brightest day. You may call it "ob-
stinate ignorance," if you like, and we will call the "great affirma-
tion" arrogant ignorance.
No, Mr. Collins, this is neither a "gas-attack" nor a "myth-
attack." The myths are all on the other side. They reach back to
the story of Adam and Eve, to the anthropomorphic conception of
man, inherent in the story of creation. It is a struggle between as-
sumptions and "'great affirmations" concerning human conduct on
one hand and of a modern scientific study of conduct on the other.
The psychologist says: "We are just beginning a scientific study
of human conduct. We realize that our shortcomings are many.
There may be insurmountable difficulties ahead, but we have no
intention of turning back. The present facts, inadequate as we
know them to be, compel us to a different view of human nature.
Just where other facts will lead us, we do not know. We may even
prove your "great affirmations," but until we do we must so far as
possible proceed as any other science proceeds. We are entirely
indifferent whether we shall establish Aristotelian dualism or
modern monism. We naturally wonder why you do not attack
modern chemistry and physics. They have done more than any
other science to interfere with free-will, to establish a monistic
conception of the universe and even the subjective interpretation
of all things than the "pseudo-sciences" of which you speak. Do
you know that those deeply versed in these sciences constantly re-
mind us of the subjectivity of the whole scientific structure?'
